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Who can approve this? What the Binance theft teaches the rest of us

Who this is for: you watched PlainCrypto Video #5 about wallets where no single device holds your whole key, then saw that Binance lost around six billion dollars in October 2026 even though, by its own account, its wallet did not rely on one key. This is the written companion to Video #6. It explains in plain English what is reported to have gone wrong, and gives you four habits and a short checklist for your own wallet.

▶ Prefer to watch? Video #6 on YouTube →
⚠ Everything about Binance here is as reported The details come from Binance's own statements and from security researchers writing about them. Binance's independent review is still to come, so some details may change. This page was last checked on 17 November 2026.

What happened, as reported

Binance says the attack was a long campaign, not a single moment. This is the sequence as Binance and the researchers describe it.

June
A tampered installerAn engineer downloaded it. Binance says it caught this one.
September
A fake job processAnother engineer was approached through a recruitment process and handed a code repository to run on his work computer. That gave the attackers a foothold.
Late October
More machines, then a tokenThe attackers reached more engineers' machines and found a token that let them run a program inside Binance's systems.
29 October
The theftThat program drained roughly $6.34 billion, according to Binance. Other analysts give slightly different totals.

All of the above is per Binance and researchers' summaries of it, not independently proven.

US authorities (the FBI and the US Secret Service) have since attributed the theft to a North Korea-linked hacking group. North Korea denies it.

The key point: nothing was forged

Here is the part that matters. Binance says no private key was stolen. Instead, the attackers got the company's own signing service to approve requests. Binance says there were about fifty of them, setting up permissions over a wallet.

A stolen key

What most people picture. Binance says this is not what happened.

A request that got approved

Someone asks the signer. The signer says yes.

Attacker's program → asks the signing service → real system signs → coins leave

A real signature from the real system.

A signing service is the system that says "yes, this payment is real". If attackers can make it say yes, the signature is perfectly genuine. Nothing was forged. The right system signed the wrong request.

What this means

Splitting a key protects the key. It does not decide who is allowed to ask for a signature. Both matter. The idea in Video #5 (no single device holds your whole key) is still a good one, but it answers a different question.

So what protects the other side? Rules about who can ask, and for how much:

A split key protects the key. Rules like these limit what a compromised signer can actually do.

Binance says it has since recovered or frozen a large share of the money and covered affected customers from its own funds, and that an independent review is still to come.

Four habits for your own wallet

You are not Binance, but the same shape exists in your wallet. Work through these, and tick each one when you have genuinely done it.

0 of 4 steps done
🎉 That is the real check.
None of this makes anything bulletproof, but asking "who can approve this?" catches a lot.

And the last step is always the same: one wrong character in an address and the coins are gone.

Check the address before you send →

Sources

Binance figures and details are as reported and may change when its independent review is published. Education, not financial advice. I'm not an advisor.

Read first: What if no single device ever held your whole key? →